Robert Merrihew Adams argues that it is permissible for a perfectly good moral agent to create a world less good than the best one she could create. He argues that God would exhibit the important virtue of grace in creating less than the best and that this virtue is incompatible with the merit considerations required by the standard of creating the best. In this paper I give three arguments for the compatibility of merit consideration and graciousness of God toward creation. (...) I conclude that grace would not release a perfect agent from responsibility to create the best. (shrink)

Plagiarism is often equated with theft, but closer inspection reveals plagiarism’s distinctive dimensions. Fundamentally, plagiarism is a form of deception, whereby the plagiarist uses the instructor as a means toward the plagiarist’s own end. Implicitly asking the instructor for a fair and accurate evaluation of the student’s abilities, the plagiarist at the same time sabotages the instructor’s capacity to make that judgment, thereby violating a duty inherent in the student-teacher relationship. Moreover, every act of plagiarism damages the plagiarist’s integrity, thereby (...) subverting his/her own well-being, while contributing as well to a widespread devaluing of education for both the individual and society. (shrink)

This work elucidates elements of Leibniz's theodicy which are non-teleological. Rather than ignoring the personal dimensions of suffering, as some have charged, Leibniz actually recognizes the threat that the problem of innocent suffering presents for a perfectly good God. His theodicy goes beyond the global greater-good defense of the best possible world argument in several ways. He appeals to personal greater-goods to justify some instances of suffering, but he also invokes deontological principles in his retributive justice arguments, his response to (...) the author of sin problem, and his constraint against damnation of infants. However, an evidential version of the problem of horrible suffering of innocents would still threaten his theodicy. This problem persists due to Leibniz's rejection of theological voluntarism in favor of a unified system of ethics for God and rational creatures. Finally, Leibniz's rejection of quietism provides an important resource for a response to suffering. His theodicy thus implies a moral activism whereby the good for each rational creature is bound up with the general good of others in the amelioration of the world. (shrink)